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SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT ANNUAL REPORT ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES (2013) (CHINA) 
Translated by Tong Li, Xiaohan Lou, Zhenan Wang, Qiuwen Xu † 
Abstract: The Supreme People’s Court of China began publishing its Annual Report 
on Intellectual Property Cases in 2008.  The annual reports, published in April of each 
year, summarize and review new intellectual property cases.  This translation includes all 
30 cases and 39 legal issues of the 2013 Annual Report.  It addresses patent law, 
trademark law, copyright law, unfair competition, contractual intellectual property rights, 
liability of intellectual property infringement, and intellectual property litigation 
procedure and evidence.  While China is not a common law country, these cases and 
guidelines provide lower courts with meaningful insight and direction.1 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION  
 
In 2013, the Supreme People’s Court of China accepted 594 new 
intellectual property (“IP) cases and issued 548 decisions.  In comparison, in 
2012, the Court accepted 359 IP cases and issued 366 decisions.  The 
characteristics and trends that this report reflects include:  
(1) The growth in IP cases resulted in an increase of 65.46% in the 
accepted number of cases by the Supreme People’s Court of 
China.  
(2) The increasing net worth and market value of patent technologies 
resulted in more complex cases.  
(3) There has been an overall increase in administrative patent cases, 
and more specifically the proportion of pharmaceutical, 
electronics, and communication cases has grown.  
(4) A large number of patent cases involved issues of claim 
interpretation.  
(5) The proportion of trademark cases has remained stable, but there 
has been an increase in the number of cases involving the 
preemption of trademark registration.  
(6) There has been a rapid increase in the number of cases involving 
disputes over the infringement of rights of new plant varieties.  
(7) The number of copyright cases involving emerging fields, such as 
software, animation, and applied arts in cultural and creative 
industries, continues to increase, and many of these cases are 
correlated with one another.  
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(8) The number of unfair competition cases relating to network 
technology, new business model, and counterfeit action disputes 
has also increased.  
(9) For the first time this year, the Supreme People’s Court decided on 
cases dealing with monopolies.  
   
  
THIS ANNUAL REPORT ADDRESSES 30 CASES AND 39 LEGAL ISSUES 
PERTAINING TO PATENT LAW, TRADEMARK LAW, COPYRIGHT LAW, UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, CONTRACTUAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, LIABILITY OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LITIGATION PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE.
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II.   PATENT CASES 
A. Civil Patent Cases 
1.  Whether the Title of the Patent Limits the 
 Scope of its Protection 
In Harbin Industrial University Xinghe 
Industrial Co. v. Jiang Su Runde Pipe 
Industry Co.,2 which involved the alleged 
infringement of a sewer pipe patent, the 
Supreme People’s Court provided that 
courts should consider the title of the patent 
when determining the scope of its 
protection.  The impact of the patent title in 
limiting the scope of protection depends on 
its actual impact on the protected subject 
matter.  
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2.  Determining the Scope of Patent 
Protection  When a Parallel Patent Claim 
Cites to a  Previous but Independent 
Patent Claim 
In the aforementioned case dealing with the 
alleged infringement of a sewer pipe patent, 
the Supreme People’s Court further clarified 
that, although a previously cited patent 
claim should be considered in determining 
the scope of protection of a parallel but 
independent claim, such previous claims do 
not necessarily limit the scope of protection 
on other parallel claims.  Whether such 
previous claims limit the scope of other 
claims depends on whether the previous 
claim’s features substantially affect the 
technical solution or the protected subject 
matter of the parallel patent claim at hand. 
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3.  Infringement Judgment Regarding 
 Closed Claims  
In Hebei Xinyu Welding Co. v. Yichang 
Monkey King Welding Wire Co.,3 the 
Supreme People’s Court held that for closed 
claims, the alleged features of an infringing 
product or method shall be deemed to fall 
outside of the scope of the patent protection, 
so long as the features are not technical and 
are not clearly recorded in the patent claim. 
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4.  Whether Adopting Reverse-Technical 
 Solutions of Well-Defined Technical 
 Methods Constitutes Infringement under 
 the Doctrine of Equivalents  
In Beijing Jerrat Spring Damper 
Technology Research Center v. Beijing 
JZTH Buffer Technology Co.,4 the Supreme 
People’s Court held that adopting reverse-
technical solutions of well-defined technical 
methods of a patent does not constitute an 
infringement under the Doctrine of 
Equivalents, so long as the reverse-technical 
solutions have a reverse technical effect and 
cannot achieve the purpose of the original 
invention.   
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5.  Whether Changing the Order of Steps in 
 a Process Patent Constitutes as an 
 Infringement under the Doctrine of 
 Equivalents  
In Zhejiang Lesheros Household Articles 
Co. v. Chen Shundi,5 the Supreme People’s 
Court decided on the issue of whether the 
order of steps in a process patent limits the 
scope of patent protection.  The Supreme 
People’s Court noted that the issue of 
whether changing the order of steps 
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constitutes an infringement under the 
Doctrine of Equivalents or would limit the 
application of the doctrine depends 
essentially on whether the steps of the 
process need to be executed in a specific 
order and whether any changes to the order 
would result in substantially different 
technical functions or effects. 
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6.  The Meaning of “Same or Similar Types 
 of  Products” in a Design Patent 
 Infringement Judgment 
 
In Jinjiang Qingyang Weiduoli Food Co. v. 
Zhangzhou Yueyuan Food Co.,6 the Supreme 
People’s Court provided that in a design 
patent infringement claim, whether the 
products are of the “same or similar type” 
depends on whether the products fulfill the 
same or similar utility purposes and 
functions.  Courts may also consider 
information regarding the products’ sales 
and actual uses as referencing factors. 
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B. Administrative Patent Cases 
7.  Similarities and Differences of Claim 
 Interpretation Methods in Patent 
 Prosecution and Civil Litigation Cases 
In Seiko Epson Co. v. Patent Reexamination 
Board of SIPO,7 which involves the 
invalidation of a cartridge patent, the 
Supreme People’s Court noted that the 
interpretation methods of a claim in patent 
prosecution and those in civil litigation may 
have fundamental similarities but may also 
differ in certain situations.  The Supreme 
People’s Court held that differences in the 
interpretation methods would manifest 
primarily in the parties’ statements of 
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opinion.  In patent prosecution, the 
applicant’s statement of opinion acts only as 
a reference to understanding the patent 
specification and patent claims, rather than 
being treated as the decisive basis. 
 
%œžǬžǵė,8ǙɍEÑ
ôƈƒƐ,ǠĶȵʗɵ¥!¯
ș^0ǓȹɌů7N¨žȴƥ
7º3Ǡ¦ȓ8ȕ#ű~ðİb
ő1
8.  Written Description Requirements of the 
 Invention’s Medical Use  
 
In Cubist Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Patent 
Reexamination Board of SIPO,8 which 
involves the invalidation of “the method of 
antibiotics administration” patent, the 
Supreme People’s Court noted that during 
the prosecution of a patent, if the nature of 
the invention and its improvement on 
existing technology manifest on the 
invention’s medical use, the claim should be 
categorized as a “pharmaceutical method” 
claim.  Furthermore, the protection scope of 
such a claim should be limited by the 
technical features associated with the 
pharmaceutical. 
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9.  Whether the Features Producing No 
 Certain Toxic Side Effects have the Effect 
 of Limiting the Medical Use Invention 
 Which the Claims Request to Protect 
 
In the aforementioned case regarding 
invalidation of “the method of 
administration of antibiotics” patent, the 
Supreme People’s Court held that the 
features of patent claims, which do not 
produce any certain toxic side-effects, shall 
not limit the invention’s medical use that the 
claims seek to protect, so long as such 
features have neither changed the known 
objects in treatment or the known indication, 
nor discovered any new properties of such 
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medicines that are sufficient to distinguish 
from the known uses. 
 
10. Whether Drug Administration Features 
 Limit the Scope of Requested Protection 
 of a Drug Manufacturing Method 
In the aforementioned case regarding 
invalidation of “antibiotic drug 
administration method” patent, the Supreme 
People’s Court held that the effects that drug 
administration features have on the drug 
manufacturing process should be judged and 
analyzed on a case-by-case basis; features 
that manifest only in drug administration are 
not technical features of drug applications 
and therefore will not limit the scope of 
protection on the drug manufacturing 
method. 
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11.  Applicability of the Distinction Between 
 Open and Close Claims in the 
 Mechanical Field 
In Beijing Century Lianbao Fire-Fighting 
New Technology Co. v. the Patent Re-
Examination Committee,9 which involves 
the invalidation of the “fire extinguishing 
equipment” patent, the Supreme People’s 
Court held that the words “contain” and 
“include” have the meaning of not excluding 
contents that are not mentioned, thereby 
serving as an important indication of open 
claims.  The distinction between open and 
closed claims generally applies in technical 
fields, such as chemistry and machinery. 
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12.  Recognition of Technical Features That 
 Distinguish a Utility Model Patent form 
 Other Patents in Open Claims 
In the aforementioned case regarding 
invalidation of “fire extinguishing 
equipment” patent, the Supreme People’s 
Court held that when recognizing a technical 
feature that distinguishes a utility model 
patent with an open claim from a reference, 
if some technical feature in the reference 
was not mentioned in the open claim, the 
lack of this technical feature generally does 
not serve as a distinct technical feature of 
the open claim as compared to the reference. 
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13.  The Existence of Technical Bias Should 
 be Determined With the Consideration 
 of the Overall Content of the Existing 
 Technology 
In Arai Star Biology Science North America 
Co. v. The Patent Re-Examination 
Committee,10 the Supreme People’s Court 
held that the existence of technical bias 
should be determined with the consideration 
of the overall content of the existing 
technology. 
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14.  Determining Whether Modifications of 
 Patent Application Documents Exceed 
 its Scope 
In Shimano Co. v. The Patent Re-
Examination Committee,11 which involved 
the invalidation of a “Rear Shifter” patent, 
the Supreme People’s Court noted that “the 
scope written in the original Specification 
and Claim” mentioned in Article 33 of 
People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) Patent 
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Law should be understood as the overall 
content of the original specification and 
claim of the invention patent.  The 
examination of whether modifications of the 
patent application documents exceed the 
aforementioned scope should take into 
consideration the technical characteristics 
and customs of the technical field, the 
knowledge and cognitive ability of a person 
with ordinary technical skill in the art, the 
inherent requirements of the technical 
solution, and so forth. 
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15.  Modifying the “Non-invention” Part of 
 the Patent Application and Its Remedies 
 
In the aforementioned case regarding 
invalidation of “Rear Shifter” invention 
patent, the Supreme People’s Court also 
noted that if the modification of the “non-
invention” part of patent application exceeds 
the scope written in the original 
Specification and Claim part of the 
application, relevant departments shall 
actively search for solutions and remedies to 
protect the creative value of inventions 
without awarding any unjust first-to-file 
benefits to the patent applicant.  This is in 
order to avoid the loss of patent rights for 
creative inventions that contribute to 
existing technology and therefore deserve 
the protection. 
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16. Whether the Patent Examiner’s 
 Approval to Modify the Patent 
 Application Documents Grant 
 Applicants Reliance-based Protection 
 
In Seiko Epson Co. v. Patent Reexamination 
Board of SIPO,12 the Supreme People’s 
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Court also noted that, as a matter of 
principle, modifying the patent application 
documents is the applicant’s right; the patent 
administration department under the State 
Council exercises its authority to examine 
patent applications, but it does not have the 
responsibility of ensuring the absolute 
correctness of patent issuance.  Therefore 
the applicant is responsible for the 
consequences of any modifications that are 
made. 
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17.  The Effect of Opinion of a Party of 
 Interest  on the Determination of the 
 Legality of Modifying Patent 
 Application Documents 
In Seiko Epson Co. v. Patent Reexamination 
Board of SIPO,13 the Supreme People’s 
Court also held that in determining the 
legality of modifying patent application 
documents, the opinion of a party of interest 
on the subject generally only serves as a 
reference for interpreting the meaning of the 
claims and the specifications; the statement 
is not decisive.  The reference value that 
such statements have depends on the content 
of the statements and its relationship to the 
specification and claims. 
Ŧ%ǙɍţOfŜű¹
´ƫŮĢ<EĶȵʗɵǠ^Ǘ



Ñɵ.Üǣ%ūşȪŞƐ
,8ŷʮEƢƫʙɯȽ08Ŧ
%ǙɍţOfŜű¹´ƫŮ8
Ģ<EǠĶȵʗɵɸĒ¯ș^0
ǓȹɌů7N¨žȴƥ7º3
Ǡ¦ȓ8ȕ#ű~ðİbőv
¦ȓP·Ǡã“«~>ɊĶȵʗ
ɵǠw[y÷¨v$Ɍů7¿ž
ȴƥ7Ǡuȁ1
III.  TRADEMARK CASES 
A. Civil Trademark Cases 
18. The Recognition and Use of a Generic 
 Term 
In Shanxi Qinzhouhuang Millet (Group) Co. 
v. Tanshanhuang Development Co.,14 the 
Supreme People’s Court held that for 
commodities formed under historical 
traditions, customs, and geographic 
=0ÅƉƐOô
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environments in relevant market, their 
ordinary name in that market may be 
regarded as a generic term.  The registered 
trademark owner cannot claim trademark 
rights over the name of the commodity 
based on his or her promotion of the 
commodity, and he or she cannot forbid 
others from using the generic term to show 
the origin of the commodity. 
08É¤±VȌ0ʪÐEĴ0Ò
Ǔ】ÛǼ¥ÉģķǠǧuĐÓɨ
0ÌðǠÅÁ8vÑɊǧuĐÓ
yǠɸǗǴɑ°NȽð0ɸǗ·
ǴƮzÅƉžE#șÉvÑɊ
ÅÁĐÓŖĕ,ǠɕǍ1ġúɊ
ÅÁǠɸǗ·ǴDŸÅƉž8ū
žǮƚJE_ǗɊɸǗ·ǴƁȮ
ůÅÁÁǰƁƺ1
B.  Administrative Trademark Cases 
19. Presumed Agents or Representatives 
 under Article 15 of the PRC Trademark 
 Law 
In Hsin Tung Yang Enterprise Inc. v. Hsin 
Tung Yang Co.,15 the Supreme People’s 
Court noted that a person who conspires 
with agents or representatives in a 
preemptive trademark registration may be 
deemed an agent or representative.  
Conspiracy in preemptive trademark 
registrations may be inferred from the 
circumstances and relationships between 
that person and the agents or 
representatives. 
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20.  The Application of and Exception to 
 “Illegal Preemptive Registration of 
 Well-Known Trademark That Has 
 Been Used by Others” in Article 31 of 
 PRC Trademark Law 
 
In Fushun Boge Environmental Protection 
Technology Co. v. Trademark Appeal Bd., 
Yingkou Fiberglass Co.,16 the Supreme 
People’s Court held that the intent to profit 
from someone else’s existing trademark and 
reputation may generally be inferred if the 
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applicant knew or should have known that 
the influential trademark had been used by 
someone else but still filed a registration 
application.  This general assumption may 
be rebutted under special circumstances, 
finding that the bad faith intent to profit 
from the existing trademark and reputation 
did not exist, regardless of the trademark’s 
influence. 
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21.  A Trademark That is Not Used for a 
Long Period of Time Does Not Enjoy the 
Same Protection of an Unregistered But 
Influential Trademark, Nor Does It Enjoy 
Any Priority Rights 
 
In Yu Xiaohua v. Trademark Review & 
Adjudication Bd.,17 the Supreme People’s 
Court held that the term “certain influences” 
under Article 31 of the PRC Trademark Law 
shall mean a type of legal effect derived 
from continuous usage, and the term 
“priority right” shall refer to the trademark 
owner’s right that is created on the 
application day of the disputed trademark. A 
trademark that is not used for a long period 
of time does not enjoy the reputation and 
influence of an unregistered trademark 
under Article 31 of the PRC Trademark 
Law, and thus neither constitutes an 
“unregistered but influential trademark,” nor 
enjoys any priority rights. 
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22. The Meaning of “Other Improper 
Means” Under Article 41, Clause 1 of 
the PRC Trademark Law 
 
In Li Longfeng v. Trademark Review & 
Adjudication Bd.,18 the Supreme People’s 
Court held that the term “obtaining 
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registration by other improper means” under 
Article 41, Clause 1 of the PRC Trademark 
Law refers to the ways of obtaining 
trademark registration that are not 
fraudulent but disturbs the order of 
trademark registration, impairs public 
interest, misappropriates public resources, or 
carries an improper purpose of seeking 
unfair benefits.  A person filing for a 
trademark registration shall have an actual 
intent to use, and his or her registration act 
shall satisfy the standard of reasonability or 
justifiability.  
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23. Name-Recognition of the Same Entity’s 
 Different Trademarks May Radiate 
Under Certain Circumstances 
 
In Bonneterie Cevenole S.A.R.L. v. 
Trademark Review & Adjudication Bd.,19 
the Supreme People’s Court held that the 
reputation of different registered trademarks 
of the same entity may radiate under certain 
circumstances.  Before the date of 
application of the disputed trademark, if the 
logo of the disputed trademark has enjoyed 
the benefits of a long-term good reputation 
and widespread usage of similar logos under 
the same entity, and if the cited trademark 
enjoys no such reputation, the scope of the 
exclusive right of the cited trademark shall 
be limited. 
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IV. COPYRIGHT CASES 
 
24. Conditions for a Work with Both Utility 
and Aestheticity Enjoys Protection as a 
Work of Fine Art 
 
In Lego Grp. v. Guangdong Loongon 
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Animation & Toys Indus. Co.,20 the Supreme 
People’s Court held that the originality 
requirements for different kinds of works 
are different.  Works of fine art require the 
expression of the author’s unique creativity 
and ideology in the field of aesthetics.  For 
works with both utility and aesthetic value, 
whether the creators may enjoy the same 
protection as the creators of fine art depends 
on the creator’s unique personality and 
creativity delivered through intellectual 
labor in the field of aesthetics.  Intellectual 
labor beyond the scope of aesthetics is 
irrelevant to the consideration of originality.  
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25. Copyright Protection Scope and the 
 Determination of Infringements for 
Three-dimensional Works of Fine Art   
 
In Jingde Zhen Franz Indus. Co. v. 
Chaozhou Jialande Porcelain Co.,21 the 
Supreme People’s Court ruled that the 
protection of copyright laws does not extend 
to design ideas and their corresponding 
technics.  A copyright holder may not 
monopolize the relevant design ideas and 
technics through copyright protection.  A 
non-copyright holder may adopt the same 
design ideas and technics in designing and 
producing products of similar themes as 
long as they do not plagiarize the original 
expression of others.  
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V. UNFAIR COMPETITION CASES 
 
26.  Inheritability of Rights Associated with 
 Unique Packaging and Adornment of 
 Famous Products 
 
In Guilin Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. 
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Sanmenxia Sinoway Pharmaceutical Co., 
Ltd.,22 which involved the alleged 
infringement of a design patent and the 
unauthorized appropriation of the unique 
packaging and adornment of well-known 
products, the Supreme People’s Court held 
that the unique packaging and adornment of 
well-known products falls under the 
property rights protection provided by the 
Law Against Unfair Competition and that 
such rights are transferable and inheritable 
accordingly. 
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27. Relationship Between Particularity and 
 Novelty Regarding Name, Packaging, 
and Adornment of Well-Known Products  
 
In Jilin Literature & History Press v. 
Chinese Press Co.,23 a case involving an 
alleged copyright infringement and unfair 
competition, the Supreme People’s Court 
held that the uniqueness of the name, 
packaging, and adornment of a well-known 
product functions to distinguish the source 
of the product rather than the product’s 
novelty and originality.  Accordingly, the 
Court provided that even if the product’s 
name, packaging, and adornment are not 
novel or original, this does not necessarily 
mean that the product is not unique. 
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28. Information with No Market Attributes 
 Are Not Trade Secrets 
 
In Wang Zhe’an v. Int’l Exch. & 
Cooperation Ctr.,24 which involved the 
alleged infringement of a trade secret, the 
Supreme People’s Court held that the 
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“competition” regulated by the Law Against 
Unfair Competition is limited to market 
competition among business entities in a 
given market.  Furthermore, the Supreme 
People’s Court provided that a trade secret 
is a market-based concept.  Information that 
merely affords a person a competitive 
advantage among his colleagues at his place 
of employment is not considered to be a 
trade secret.   
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VI.  CONTRACTUAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS CASES 
 
29. A Licensing Contract Survives the 
 Licensing of Unregistered Trademarks 
 
In Beijing Yehongda Trading Co. v. Tianjin 
Dev. Zone Taisheng Trading Co.,25 the 
Supreme People’s Court held that no laws or 
regulations forbid licensing of unregistered 
trademarks.  Accordingly, where the parties 
to the licensing contract did not address the 
registration of the trademarks, there is no 
legal basis to support a claim that the 
licensing of unregistered trademarks 
constitutes fraud and invalidates the 
licensing contract.  
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30. The Technology Assignor’s Continued 
 Obligation to Ensure Authenticity  
 
In Jiangsu Jumpcan Pharm. Grp. Co. v. 
Beijing Furuikangzheng Med. Tech. 
Research Inst.,26 a case involving a 
technology assignment contract dispute, the 
Supreme People’s Court held that, for 
assigning any technology under the category 
of clinical trial medicine, the assignor 
assumes both the contractual and legal 
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obligations in ensuring the authenticity and 
reliability of the declared information during 
the subsequent drug approval and 
production phases.   
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VII. LIABILITY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
INFRINGEMENTS 
 
31. Determining Specific Manners to Cease 
 Tortious Act 
 
In the aforementioned unfair competition 
case Jilin Literature & History Press v. 
Chinese Press Co., the Supreme People’s 
Court further noted that in determining 
specific manners to cease tortious acts, 
courts shall consider (1) the rule of 
proportionality, (2) the specific 
characteristics of the alleged tortious act, 
and (3) the purposefulness, necessity, and 
fairness of the remedy.  
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32.  Civil Liability Arising from a Conflict 
 Between a Business Name and a 
 Registered Trademark  
In Beijing Dabao Cosmetics Co. Ltd. v. 
Dabao Daily Chemical Products Factory,27 
which involved the alleged infringement of 
a trademark, the Supreme People’s Court 
held that cases arising from conflicts 
between business names and registered 
trademarks shall be decided on a case-by-
case basis.  If the use of a business name 
infringes upon a registered trademark, the 
Court may direct the business to modify its 
infringing business name.  If, however, the 
use of the business name is in good faith and 
based on special historical considerations, a 
modification of the business name may not 
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be necessary. 
33. Courts May Use Prior Agreements 
 Between a Patentee and an Infringer In 
 Determining Damages  
In Lerado (Zhongshan) Industrial Co., Ltd. 
v. Hubei Tongba Children’s Appliances Co., 
Ltd.,28 which involved the alleged 
infringement of a utility model patent, the 
Supreme People’s Court held that if the 
infringer and the patentee previously 
reached an agreement on damages for any 
infringements, and the infringer 
subsequently infringes, the court may adopt 
the provisions of the agreement in 
determining damages. 
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VII. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LITIGATION 
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 
 
34. “The Place of the Infringement’s 
 Outcome” Shall Be Understood as the 
 Place Where the Direct Results of the 
 Infringing Activities Take Place 
In Zhengzhou Runda Electric-Powered 
Cleaning Co. v. Hubei Jieda Environmental 
Engineering Co. Ltd.,29 which involved a 
jurisdictional dispute in an alleged trade 
secret infringement case, the Supreme 
People’s Court provided that the “place of 
the infringement’s outcome” shall be 
understood as the place where the direct 
result of the infringing activities took place.  
It is not necessarily the plaintiff’s place of 
domicile where the plaintiff suffered injury 
from the infringement.   
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35. Claims, Which Were Closely Related but 
 Developed Against it, Can Be 
 Adjudicated as Counter-Claims 
In Gree (Jiangxi) Trading Co. v. Midea 
(Jiangxi) Refrigerating Appliances Sales 
Co.,30 which involves unfair competition, 
the Supreme People’s Court held that it is 
not necessary for counter-claims to be based 
on the same facts and legal relationships 
among parties.  Based on the overlapping 
causes of action, if a second claim is closely 
related to a first claim, but  obviously 
developed against it adversely, it can be 
adjudicated as a counter-claim.   
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36.  Key Evidence Submitted Late Due to a 
 Change of Litigation Focus Should Be 
 Regarded as New Evidence 
In Astellas Pharma Inc. v. Chengdu List 
Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.,31 which involved 
the alleged patent infringement of a process 
used to manufacture 
Tetrahydrobenzimidazole derivatives, the 
Supreme People’s Court held that if a party 
submits additional key evidence after the 
deadline to submit evidence due to a change 
of focus of the ongoing litigation, and if the 
omission of such evidence may lead to 
obvious injustice, then courts shall accept 
the evidence as new evidence.   
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37. The Validity of a Court’s Power to 
 Collect Necessary Evidence 
In the aforementioned case Astellas Pharma 
Inc. v. Chengdu List Pharmaceutical Co. 
Ltd, the Supreme People’s Court held that 
the Civil Procedure of China authorizes the 
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courts’ power to collect necessary evidence 
to investigate and verify the authenticity of 
submitted evidence.  Thus, a court’s 
collection of necessary evidence does not 
violate civil procedure.   
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38.  Admissibility of a Conclusion Certified 
 by a Foreign Agency 
In Tsuburaya Production Co., Ltd. v. 
Sompote Saengduenchai,32 a copyright 
infringement case, the Supreme People’s 
Court held that a certified conclusion may 
only be admitted as a basis for fact 
determination through judicial examination.  
Undisputed certified conclusions resulting 
from lawful certifying procedures are 
generally admissible as a basis for fact 
determination.  For conclusions certified by 
a foreign agency, if a party disputes the 
admissibility of the foreign agency’s 
conclusion, then an examination shall be 
conducted pursuant to applicable Chinese 
laws.   
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39.  Fact Determination in the Infringement 
 of a Patented Process to Manufacture 
 Pre-existing Products 
In Weifang Henglian Jiangzhi Co., Ltd. v. 
Yibin Changyi Jiangbo Co. Ltd.,33 a patent 
infringement case, the Supreme People’s 
Court held that if (1) the patentee can prove 
that the alleged infringer manufactured 
identical products, (2) the patentee cannot 
prove that the alleged infringer used the 
patented process but can establish that it is 
highly likely that such products were 
manufactured through the use of the 
patented process based on the facts, and (3) 
the alleged infringer refuses to cooperate 
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† Translators are listed in alphabetical order:  Tong Li, Juris expected 2016, University of 
Washington School of Law; Xiaohan Lou, Juris Doctor expected 2016, University of Washington School 
of Law.  Zhenan Wang, Juris Doctor expected 2016, University of Washington School of Law; Zhenan 
Wang, Juris Doctor expected 2016, University of Washington School of Law;  Qiuwen Xu, Juris Doctor 
expected 2015, University of Washington School of Law.  The Translators would like to thank Sook Kim 
and the editorial staff for their support.   
1 The abstract and introduction was written by Sook Kim, Executive Translation Editor of the 
Washington International Law Journal, Juris Doctor expected 2015, University of Washington School of 
Law. 
2 Xinghe Gongsi yu Runde Gongsi Qinhan Zhuanli Quan Jiufen An (ŰƩq³$ƶĪq³cöª
ů%žȃȇƐ) [Harbin Indus. Univ. Xinghe Indus. Co. v. Jiang Su Runde Pipe Indus. Co.], Civil 
Application for Retrial No. 790 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2013).  As the owner of a patent entitled “One Kind of 
Steel Reinforced Plastic Sewer Pipe and Its Manufacturing Method and Apparatus,” plaintiff Harbin 
Industrial University Xinghe Industrial Co., Ltd. (“Xinghe”) brought a patent infringement claim against 
defendant Jiang Su Runde Pipe Industry Co., Ltd. (“Runde”).  The patent included several independent 
claims, titled respectively: §1 A kind of steel reinforced plastic sewer pipe; §2 A method used to 
manufacture the pipe described in §1; and §6 An apparatus used to carry out the Method described in §2.  
The sewer pipes produced by Runde were made in the same method and apparatus as described in §2 and 
§6, but the pipes didn’t share two technical features that were recorded in the first independent claim (§1).  
The latter two independent claims (§2 and §6) both cited the first independent claim.  The Supreme 
People’s Court concluded that, in this case, titles of §2 and §6 should be taken into consideration when 
determining the scope of the claim; because titles of §2 and §6 cited §1, the contents of those two technical 
features recorded in §1 should have a substantial effect on the latter two independent claims and thus have 
actual limitation effect on defining the scope of protection of the patent.  For this reason, the pipes made by 
Runde, as well as the method and apparatus Runde used to manufacture the pipes, fell out of the protection 
of Xinghe’s patent.    
 
3 Xinyu Gongsi yu Houwang Gongsi Qinhan Zhuanli Quan Jiufen An (ʊíq³$ǎ【q³cö
ªů%žȃȇƐ) [Hebei Xinyu Welding Co. v. Yichang Monkey King Welding Wire Co.], Civil 
Application for Retrial No. 1201 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2013).  As the exclusive-licensed holder of a patent 
entitled, “High-strength Structural Steel Gas-shielded Welding Wire,” plaintiff Hebei Xinyu Welding Co., 
Ltd. (“Xinyu”) brought a patent infringement claim against defendant Yichang Monkey King Welding 
Wire Co., Ltd. (“Monkey King”).  In its patent claim one, it specified that this product “is composed of” a 
variety of named elements with different percentages.  The Supreme People’s Court concluded that it was a 
closed claim.  The alleged infringing product produced by Monkey King, besides all the elements listed in 
Xinyu’s patent claim one, also contained 0.049% Ni, one element which was explicitly excluded in Xinyu’s 
patent claim one.  Consequently, the allegedly infringing product fell out of the protection of Xinyu’s 
patent. 
with the investigation, collection, or 
conservation of evidence by the court, then 
the court may infer from common sense and 
the particular circumstances that the alleged 
infringement of the patented process did 
occur.   
ɏƈśʜɅőĸȔdpɅőǠ8
°NŖðȯɉcžE_Ǘ9Ɋ%
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4 Jieruite Zhongxin yu Jinzi Tianhe Gongsi deng Qinhan Shiyong Xinxing Zhuanli Quan Jiufen An 
(Œǔ《,ī$ʈȚä¿q³ǼcöóǗŨ×%žȃȇƐ) [Beijing Jerrat Spring Damper Tech. 
Research Ctr. v. Beijing JZTH Buffer Tech. Co.], CIVIL APPLICATION FOR RETRIAL NO. 1146 (Sup. 
People’s Ct. 2013).  As the owner of a patent entitled “Fast-in-and-slow-out Type Elastic Buffer Damper,” 
plaintiff Beijing Jerrat Spring Damper Technology Research Center brought a patent infringement claim 
against defendant Beijing JZTH Buffer Technology Co., Ltd.  The alleged infringing product used the 
opposite unidirectional current limiting device installation and achieved the slow-in-and-fast-out result. 
5 Lexue’er Gongsi yu Chen Shundi deng Qinhai Zhuanli Quan Jiufen An (5ʝkq³$ʗʤĠǼ
cö%žȃȇƐ) [Zhejiang Lesheros Household Articles Co. v. Chen Shundi], CIVIL RETRIAL NO. 225 
(Sup. People’s Ct. 2013).  As the owner of a patent entitled “Processing Method of Fabric Plastic Bag 
Holder,” plaintiff Chen Shundi brought a patent infringement claim against defendant Zhejiang Leshoros 
Household Articles Co., Ltd.  The patent claim specified twelve steps in its processing method.  The 
alleged infringing method skipped three of the twelve steps, and the step order was also different.  The 
Higher People’s Court decided that the alleged infringement falls within the scope of patent protection.  
The Supreme People’s Court overturned, ruling that one certain step swap with the alleged infringing 
method improved the process efficiency, and such a change of the step order brought substantive 
differences on the technical effects. 
 
6 Weiduoli Gongsi yu Yueyuan Gongsi deng Qinhan Waiguan Sheji Zhuanli Quan Jiufen An (ȏá
q³$ɢɲq³ǼcöàȶɄȼ%žȃȇƐ) [Jinjiang Qingyang Weiduoli Food Co. v. Zhangzhou 
Yueyuan Food Co.], CIVIL APPLICATION FOR RETRIAL NO. 1658 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2013).  As the 
exclusive-licensed holder of a design patent entitled “Crafts (Pineapple Compote),” plaintiff Zhangzhou 
Yueyuan Food Co., Ltd. brought a design patent infringement claim against defendant Jinjiang Qingyang 
Weiduoli Food Co., Ltd. (“Weiduoli”) for using a similar design in its jelly food package.  The Supreme 
People’s Court affirmed the Higher People’s Court’s decision, reasoning that the use of a similar design by 
Weiduoli constituted infringement because the alleged infringing product can be used as a decoration after 
the jelly is eaten, and thus the alleged infringing and infringed products belong to the same or a similar type. 
7 “Mohe” Zhuanli Wuxiao Xingzheng An (“Üǣ”%ūşȪŞƐ) [Seiko Epson Co. v. Patent 
Reexamination Bd. of SIPO], ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW NO.53-1 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2010).  Defendant 
Seiko Epson Co., Ltd. is the applicant and owner of the patent “Cartridge” in this case.  The defendant filed 
application documents in 1999 and acquired the patent in 2000.  The original application documents and 
specifications contained terms of “semiconductor storage device” and “storage device” but has no reference 
to a “memory device.”  In subsequent years, the defendant has made multiple requests to have its claims 
under its “Cartridge” patent modified, including adding several patent claims related to a “memory device” 
and a “storage device.”  At one time, the defendant requested certain numbers of patent claims under 
“memory device” to be replaced by “storage device.”  In its opinion narrative, the defendant explained that 
“the ‘memory device’ in the patent claims shall refer to the circuit board and the semiconductor storage 
device that is on top of the circuit board.”  Regarding the defendant’s ownership of the patent in this case, 
Foshan Kaideli Office Supplies Co., Ltd. and two other parties filed patent invalidation requests separately 
with the Patent Reexamination Board.  The Chinese Patent Law requires a patent specification to make a 
clear and complete description of the invention, and modifying patent application documents shall not 
exceed the scope of the recorded original specification.  The Supreme People’s Court allowed the 
modification from “memory device” to “storage device,” but sustained the invalidation decision of the 
Patent Reexamination Board, reasoning that the patent’s specifications and examination files, rather than 
the patent owner’s opinion narrative, shall be regarded as the decisive basis in examining whether a patent 
or patent application meets the above-mentioned requirements.   
 
8 “Kangshengsu de Geiyao Fangfa” Faming Zhuanli Wuxiao Xingzheng An (“łǖȂǠȋȢũƫ”
ªů%ūşȪŞƐ) [Cubist Pharm., Inc. v. Patent Reexamination Bd. of SIPO], ADMINISTRATIVE 
APPLICATION FOR RETRIAL NO.75 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2012).  In 2004, defendant Cubist Pharmaceuticals 
Inc. acquired an invention patent of “Method of Administration of Antibiotics,” which describes the 
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medical doses and intervals of daptomycin in treating bacterial infections.  In 2008, plaintiff Xiao Hong 
filed a patent invalidation request with the Patent Reexamination Board together with evidences showing 
the effects, working theory, and alternative medication methods of daptomycin.  The Supreme People’s 
Court sustained the invalidation decision of the Patent Reexamination Board, reasoning that based on 
current Chinese Patent Law, if the nature of the invention manifests on the substance’s medical use, the 
patent grant is valid only when the substance is used in the pharmaceutical process.  The Supreme People’s 
Court found no novelty regarding the substance’s medical use in this case, because the mere act of 
changing the time interval in the dosing regimen has nothing to do with the pharmaceutical method.  
 
9 Shiji Lianbao Gongsi yu Zhuanli Fushen Weiyuanhui deng Faming Zhuanli Quan Wuxiao 
Xingzheng Jiufen An (Ȇȗ%%1ô5½ªT%žSONȃȇ\) [Beijing 
Century Lianbao Fire-Fighting New Technology Co. v. the Patent Re-Examination Committee], IP 
ADMINISTRATIVE RETRIAL NO. 20 (Sup. People's Ct. 2012). Century Lianbao Fire-Fighting New 
Technology Co., Ltd. was the patent owner of a patent entitled “Pulsed Superfine Powder Automatic Fire 
Extinguishing Device (‘Fire Extinguishing Device’).” The patent specification read:  
1. The Pulsed Superfine Powder Automatic Fire Extinguishing Device contains a starter 
and a shell covering pulsed superfine extinguishing powder; its feature lies in that it 
contains: a shell, which includes an outer skin, pulsed superfine extinguishing powder 
stored under the outer skin, and aluminum coating which seals the shell nozzle; a starter 
with a conduction velocity faster than 0.5 m/s, which includes a starter subassembly 
consists of a thermosensitive wire which has an ignition point equals to or is above 135 
Celsius degree and is sensitive to flames and temperature and a drivepipe coating the 
thermosensitive wire, and an aerogenesis subassembly consists of an aluminum plate 
pressed in the inner sider of shell by screws and the perforated bolt penetrated with the 
thermosensitive wire, aerogenesis substances contacting the thermosensitive wire, and a 
non-metal film pressed to the aluminum plate to wrap the aerogenesis substances. 
Shanxi Zhong Yuan Fire Fighting Equipment Co., Ltd. submitted this attachment as a reference, which is a 
fire extinguishing device including a Porous Part, and requested that the Patent Reexamination Board 
invalidate the patent. The Board declared the patent invalid, but did not recognize the lack of a Porous Part 
as a distinguish character. The Supreme People’s Court affirmed the decision, on the basis that the 
distinction between open-ended and close-ended claims applies in machinery area; though the patent “Fire 
Extinguishing Device” did not mention a Porous Part, the lack of a mention of a part generally does not 
serve as a distinguishing character.  
10 Aruisita Gongsi yu Zhuanli Fushen Weiyuanhui Faming Zhuanli Quan Xingzheng Jiufen An (
pQ/%tɉ
%1ô5½ªT%žNȃȇ )[Arai Star Biology Science North 
America Co. v. The Patent Re-Examination Committee], ADMINISTRATIVE-REVIEW NO. 31 (Sup. People’s 
Ct. 2013).  The Arai Star Biology Science North America Co., Ltd. was the applicant of the patent 
“Selective Herbicide Based On Substituted Phenyl Sulfanyl Amino Carbonyl Triazolinones,” which applies 
Formula 1 Compound solely to a restricted scope of herbs.  The PRC State Intellectual Property Office 
denied the application based on lack of novelty and inventiveness, as compared to Reference 1 
(US5534486A) and Reference 2 (WO98/12923A1).  The Supreme People’s Court noted that Reference 2 
demonstrated that the sole application of Formula 1 Compound to a certain kind of herb is not as effective 
as a mixed application of Formula 1 Compound and other ingredients like herbicide; it shows that the sole 
application of Formula 1 Compound exists in existing technology, and there is no technical basis to exclude 
the sole application of Formula 1 compound to certain herbs. 
11 Zhushi Huishe Daoye yu Zhuanli Fushen Weiyuanhui deng Faming Zhuanli Quan Wuxiao 
Xingzheng Jiufen An (YF{Ċ%1ô5½ªT%žSONȃȇ\) [Shimano Co. v. 
The Patent Re-Examination Committee], IP ADMINISTRATIVE RETRIAL NO. 21 (Sup. People's Ct. 2013). 
Shimano Co., Ltd. was the owner of the patent entitled “Rear Shifter”; this case derives from the 
authorization of a divisional application of the original application “Rear Shifter.”  The divisional patent 
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claim modified the phrases “round screw hole,” “round-shaped screw hole” and “screw hole” in the 
original application into “round hole,” and modified “mould pressing” to “pressing.”  Ningbo Saiguan 
Bicycle Co., Ltd. requested the patent invalid, claiming that modification exceeded “the scope written in 
original Specification and Claim.” The Supreme People’s Court held that changing from “round screw 
hole,” “round-shaped screw hole” or “screw hole” to “round hole,” and changing from “mould pressing” to 
“pressing” would make persons having ordinary skills in this field get information that is different from the 
original Specification and Claim, therefore exceeded the scope. But since the modification concerned with 
non-invention part, relevant departments should seek actively for possible remedies to save the value of 
deserving inventions.  
12 See supra endnote 7. 
13 Id. 
14 Qinzhouhuang Gongsi yu Tanshanhuang Fazhan Gongsi deng Qinhai Shangbiao Quan Jiufen An 
(a@%^=wª<%9,Ɖžȃȇ\) [Shanxi Qinzhouhuang Millet (Group) Co. v. 
Tanshanhuang Development Co.], CIVIL APPLICATION FOR RETRIAL NO. 1642 (Sup. People's Ct. 2013).  
Shanxi Qinzhouhuang Millet (Group) Co., Ltd. (“Qinzhouhuang”) has the right of exclusive use of the 
trademark “Qinzhou,” which was recognized as Well-Known Trademark of the City of Changzhi, and 
Famous Trademark and Reputed Trademark of the Province of Shanxi.  Tanshanhuang Development Co., 
Ltd. (“Tanshanhuang”) used “Qinzhouhuang” on its millet products—but as the name of the millet, not as a 
trademark.  Qinzhouhuang complained that Tanshanhuang infringed its trademark rights.  The Supreme 
People’s Court noted that “Qinzhouhuang” is the name of a breed, which refers to millet produced in a 
certain region through certain technical procedures, and therefore reflects the difference between the 
specific breed and other breeds.  Thus, it was a generic term even before the registration of the trademark 
“Qinzhou.”  
15 Xin Dongyang Qiye Gongsi yu Xin Dongyang Gufen Gongsi Shangbiao Yiyi Fushen Xingzheng Jiufen 
An (R)(%R)%,ƉEȿ1ôNȃȇ\) [Hsin Tung Yang Enterprise Inc. v. 
Hsin Tung Yang Co.], ADMINISTRATIVE-REVIEW NO. 31 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2013). Hsin Tung Yang 
Enterprise Inc. (“Enterprise”) was the applicant for the registration of the trademark “Hsin Tung Yang Jitu.” 
Hsin Tung Yang Co., Ltd. (“Corporation”) raised an objection to the application but was denied the 
objection. Corporation therefore filed the complaint to the court. The Supreme People’s Court noted that 
Shilai Mai used to be the vice president of the Board of Directors of Corporation, used to be responsible for 
Shanghai Hsin Tung Yang Food Co., Ltd., which was invested by Corporation, and was still serving as one 
of the directors and was a representative of Corporation at the time of the lawsuit. It also noted that both 
parties agreed that “Shilai Mai was appointed by the Board of Corporation as the exclusive representative 
in charge of all business in China mainland”; therefore Shilai Mai was a representative of Corporation and 
could not register “Hsin Tung Yang” under his own name in mainland China without permission from 
Corporation. Furthermore, Shilai Mai registered under the name of Enterprise, of which he was the 
statutory representative, therefore Enterprise could be regarded as a representative or statutory agent of 
Corporation under Rule 15 of the PRC Trademark Law.  
16 Fushun Boge Gongsi yu Shangbiao Pingshen Weiyuanhui, Yingkou Boxian Gongsi Shangbiao 
Zhengyi Xingzheng Jiufen An (Ńʤ Z%,ƉɆô5½Ȥ"oȄ%,ƉȿNȃȇ\) 
[Fushun Boge Environmental Protection Technology Co. v. Trademark Appeal Bd., Yingkou Fiberglass 
Co.], IP ADMINISTRATIVE RETRIAL NO. 11 (Sup. People's Ct. 2013).  Fushun Industrial Fabric Factory 
(“Factory”) was the owner of the trademark “Fumeisi FMS,” which was later transferred to Fushun Boge 
Environmental Protection Technology Co., Ltd..  Yingkou Fiberglass Co., Ltd. (“Fiberglass”) requested 
revocation.  Fiberglass was the main developer and nominator of FMS products, and was therefore awarded 
a National New Product Certificate and National “Torch Plan” Project Certificate, among other certificates.  
But Factory and Fiberglass both started using the trademark “Fumeisi FMS” at almost the same time, and 
both knew that the other corporation was using the same trademark.  Additionally, Factory sold the product 
on a larger scale than Fiberglass.  The Supreme Court held that the trademark should not be annulled 
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because there was no evidence that Factory had a bad intent in applying for the registration of the 
trademark “Fumeisi FMS.” 
17 Yu Xiaohua yu Shangbiao Pingshen Weiyuan Hui deng Shangbiao Zhengyi Xingzheng Jiufen An 
(]ų$ÅƉɆôé½UǼÅƉ;ȿȪŞȃȇƐ) [Yu Xiaohua v. Trademark Review & Adjudication 
Bd.], ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW NO. 80 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2013).  Defendant Chengdu Tongdefu Peach 
Slice Co., Ltd. had the disputed trademark “TONGDEFU and the image” registered on October 14, 1998.  
On April 24, 2003, plaintiff Yu Xiaohua brought a claim against the defendant requesting that the disputed 
trademark be deregistered.  After the Trademark Review and Adjudication Board decided to maintain the 
registration of the disputed trademark because the facts showed that the plaintiff had ceased using 
“TONGDEFU and the image” forty years prior, the plaintiff brought an administrative case against the 
defendant in front of the No. 1 Intermediary People’s Court of Beijing.  The court affirmed the decision of 
the Trademark Review and Adjudication Board, and the Higher People’s Court of Beijing dismissed the 
appeal.  The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme People’s Court, which again dismissed the appeal.  The 
Court ruled that under Article 31 of the Trademark Law, the term “a trademark that was previously used by 
others and has certain influences” refers to an unregistered trademark that has been used for a certain 
amount of time and enjoys a reputation within a certain public group due to a certain amount of sales 
volume and commercial advertisement.  Therefore, the term can be distinguished from the source of the 
commodity. 
 
18  Li Longfeng yu Shangbiao Pingshen Weiyuan Hui deng Shangbiao Zhengyi Xingzheng Jiufen An 
(ſʛ-$ÅƉɆôé½UǼÅƉ;ȿȪŞȃȇƐ) [Li Longfeng v. Trademark Review & Adjudication 
Bd.], ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW NO. 41-42 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2013). Plaintiff Li Longfeng had two 
disputed trademarks registered under the name of “Haitang Bay.” Later, Defendant Sanya Haitang Bay 
Administrative Committee requested that the Trademark Review and Adjudication Board revoke the 
registration of the trademarks. After the Trademark Review and Adjudication Board granted Sanya Haitang 
Bay Administrative Committee such request, the plaintiff brought an administrative case in front of the No. 
1 Intermediary Court of Beijing, which made a ruling to reverse the decision made by the Trademark 
Review and Adjudication Board. Following that, the defendant appealed to the Higher People’s Court of 
Beijing, which reversed the lower court’s ruling, and the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme People’s Court. 
The Supreme People’s Court reversed again, deciding that where Li Longfeng took advantage of the local 
government’s efforts in promoting Haitang Bay Resorts and other developing projects that had brought 
popularity to the name of “Haitang Bay”, his subsequent act of registering multiple “Haitang Bay” 
trademarks without good reason does not show actual intent to use.  Thus, he indeed misappropriated 
public resources and disturbed the order of trademark registration. 
19  Boneiteli Saiwenaole Youxian Gongsi yu Shangbiao Pingshen Weiyuan Hui deng Shangbiao 
Zhengyi Xingzheng Jiufen An ( k0P4W%,ƉɆô5½,ƉȿNȃȇ\) 
[Bonneterie Cevenole S.A.R.L. v. Trademark Review & Adjudication Bd.], Administrative Retrial No. 28 
(Sup. People’s Ct. 2012).  Plaintiff Bonneterie Cevenole S.A.R.L. had its “flower image” trademark 
(“disputed trademark”) registered under category twenty-five in 2003.  Defendant Foshan Mingshi 
Industrial Co., Ltd. had its “flower image” trademark (“cited trademark”) registered under category twenty-
six in 2001.  In 2005, the latter requested the Trademark Review and Adjudication Board revoke 
Bonneterie Cevenole S.A.R.L.’s registration of the disputed trademark.  After the Trademark Review and 
Adjudication Board granted Foshan Mingshi Industrial Co., Ltd.’s request, the plaintiff brought an 
administrative case in front of the No. 1 Intermediary Court of Beijing, which made a ruling to affirm the 
decision made by the Trademark Review and Adjudication Board.  The plaintiff appealed to the Higher 
People’s Court of Beijing, which affirmed the lower court’s ruling. The plaintiff then appealed to the 
Supreme People’s Court.  The Supreme People’s Court reversed the previous rulings, deciding that where 
the defendant’s cited trademark was not well-known before the date of application of registration, the 
disputed trademark became a famous one quickly because of plaintiff’s decades of business reputation.  To 
allow the two trademarks to exist would not harm the public’s ability to distinguish the two trademarks 
under different categories. Further, the Court ruled that defendant’s cited trademark enjoys exclusive right 
of use, but because of its lack of reputation, the trademark had a limited right to exclude. 
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20  Legao Gongsi yu Guangdong Xiao Bailong Dongman Wanju Shiye Youxian Gongsi deng Qinhai 
Zhuzuo Quan Jiufen An ( %B ;v  gn  W%9权  \) [Lego Grp. 
v. Guangdong Loongon Animation & Toys Indus. Co.], Civil Application for Retrial No. 1262-71, 1275-82, 
1327-46, 1348-65 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2013).  Plaintiff Lego Group brought suit against defendants 
Guangdong Loongon Animation & Toys Industry Co., Ltd. and Beijing Huayuan Xidan Shopping Center 
Co., Ltd. for producing and selling toys which infringed the plaintiff’s copyright.  The No.1 Intermediary 
Court of Beijing decided in the first instance that the toys in question did not possess originality and thus 
could not be regarded as artworks.  The plaintiff appealed the ruling to the Supreme People’s Court, which 
again dismissed the case.  According to the Supreme People’s Court, the plaintiff designed the toys in 
question independently with a certain amount of labor and capital.  However, independent accomplishment 
and labor are not sufficient conditions to give an object the protection of the Copyright Law.  In this case, 
because the toys do not possess aesthetic uniqueness, they did not have the required originality under the 
Copyright Law.  Further, the status of registration of the toys in question cannot itself constitute the base 
for protection of the Copyright Law. 
 
21  Jingde Zhen Falan Ci Shiye Youxian Gongsi yu Chaozhou Shi Jialande Taoci Youxian Gongsi 
Qinhai Zhuzuo Quan Jiufen An (VH b q  W%i@A HqW%9权
  \) [Jingde Zhen Franz Indus. Co. v. Chaozhou Jialande Porcelain Co.], Civil Application for Retrial 
No. 1392 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2012).  Plaintiff Jingde Zhen Franz Industry Co., Ltd. acquired from the 
copyright owner, Haichang Industry Co., Ltd., the exclusive right of use on a series of porcelain products 
under the names of “Hummer,” “Cranberry,” “Hummer Display,” among others.  Defendant Chaozhou 
Jialande Porcelain Co., Ltd. produced porcelain products under the names of “Solanum,” “Gold Fish,” and 
“Iris.”  Claiming that the defendant’s design of porcelain products was an intentional imitation of the 
plaintiff’s porcelain products, the plaintiff brought a copyright infringement case against the defendant.  
The local counts ruled that only the “Solanum” series products and certain products in the “Iris” series 
constituted copyright infringement of the plaintiff’s products.  The plaintiff then appealed to the Supreme 
People’s Court, which dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal request. According to the Supreme People’s Court, 
imitation is the basic means of promoting progress in literature, arts, science, social science, and 
engineering.  The Copyright Law does not forbid moderate imitation as long as no original expression is 
plagiarized. In this case, certain products in the “Iris” series and all in the “Gold Fish” series are similar to 
Haichang Industry Co., Ltd.’s designed products.  However, the difference is also conspicuous, thus the 
defendant’s act is within the allowed ambit of legal imitation. 
 
22 Guilin Nanyao Gufen Youxian Gongsi yu Sanmen Xia Sainuowei Zhiyao Youxian Gongsi Qinhai 
Waiguan Sheji Zhuanli Quan he Shanzi Shiyong Zhiming Shangpin Teyou Baozhuang, Zhuanghuang 
Jiufen An ([XȢW%ʏ>ɟɎȏȢW%92ȶɄȼ%ž*Msy
),+kWhȃȇ\) [Guilin Pharm. Co. v. Sanmen Xia Sinoway Pharm. Co.], Civil Retrial 
No. 163 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2013).  In October 1963, Guilin Pharmaceutical Company received official 
permission to produce lactasin tablets. From 1979 to 2000, relevant governmental agencies granted the 
lactasin tablets produced by Guilin Pharmaceutical Company the names “Famous Products” and “Quality 
Products” for several times.  In June 2011, Guilin Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., plaintiff in this case, was 
founded. Later that year, Guilin Pharmaceutical Company’s seventy-two kinds of medicines, including the 
said lactasin tablets, changed their “name of producer” to the plaintiff.  In 2002 and 2006, the plaintiff 
applied twice for packaging design of its lactasin tablets, and both versions were approved with the second 
roughly the same as the first except for minor differences.  In December 2010, Gulin Pharmaceutical 
Company (the entity changed its name at the time of the merger) merged into the plaintiff. In March 2005, 
defendant Sanmen Xia Sinoway Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. established Sanmen Xia Huayi Pharmaceutical 
Co., Ltd. and latermerged with it.  From 2008, defendant (and Sanmen Xia Huayi Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.) 
applied for packaging design and used approximately the same label for its own lactasin tablets.  The 
plaintiff brought suit against the defendant claiming that the defendant’s act constituted unfair competition.  
When the lower courts ruled for the defendant because of severance of product reputation due to change of 
producer and merger, plaintiff appealed to the Supreme People’s Court, which dismissed the lower courts’ 
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rulings and decided that the defendant should stop its unfair competition by using the packaging design and 
make economic compensation of 213,200 RMB to the plaintiff.  According to the Supreme People’s Court, 
because the plaintiff and Guilin Pharmaceutical Company had a very special relationship of inheritability, 
both produce the same lactasin tablets, and both use substantially the same packaging design, the plaintiff is 
entitled to inherit the unique packaging and decoration of the famous products owned by Guilin 
Pharmaceutical Company. 
 
23 Jilin Wenshi Chuban She yu Huawen Chuban She Youxian Gongsi deng Qinhai Zhuzuoquan ji Bu 
Zhengdang Jingzheng Jiufen An ('XP$j{Pj{W%9ž!_Gǹ
ȃȇ\) [Jilin Literature & History Press v. Chinese Press Co.], Civil Application for Retrial No. 371 (Sup. 
People’s Ct. 2013).  Plaintiff Jilin Literature and History Press received the exclusive authority to publish 
“Men Are from Mars, Women Are From Venus” by Dr. John Grey.  The plaintiff had a certain cover 
design for the book and had maintained good sales records on Chinese market from 2007 to 2011.  In 
January 2011, defendant Chinese Press Co., Ltd. published “Collected Edition of Man Are from Mars, 
Women Are from Venus” by Zhuo Wenming.  Because the defendant’s book has very similar cover design 
as the plaintiff’s book, the plaintiff sued the defendant for copyright infringement and unfair competition.  
The local courts ruled that the defendant’s use of a similar name and decoration of a famous product 
constituted unfair competition and that it should compensate the plaintiff for the loss of profit.  The 
defendant appealed to the Supreme People’s Court, which dismissed its appeal request. According to the 
Supreme People’s Court, to the relevant public, if a product’s name, packaging, or decoration is objectively 
able to distinguish the product from other sources of products, it then has the uniqueness that is required in 
Article V, Paragraph II of the Law Against Unfair Competition.  In this case, the plaintiff’s book had 
enjoyed a good reputation, and its decoration design was fairly distinguishable.  Thus the uniqueness of 
decoration of famous product was established. 
 
24 Wang Zhe’an yu Weisheng Bu Guoji Jiaoliu yu Hezuo Zhongxin deng Qinhai Shangye Mimi 
Jiufen An (m6¡r-ʖf&I9,(}:ȃȇ\) [Wang Zhe’an v. Int’l Exch. 
& Cooperation Ctr.], Civil Application for Retrial No. 1238 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2013).  Plaintiff Wang 
Zhe’an was an employee of the International Exchange and Cooperation Center under the National Health 
and Family Planning Commission, one of the defendants in this case. Starting May 2000, the plaintiff 
participated in and accomplished the “Measures for Distribution System Reform of the International 
Exchange and Cooperation Center (hereinafter called “Reform Measures”).”  Later, the plaintiff filed a suit 
against the International Exchange and Cooperation Center, its former director Li Hongshan, and Yuan 
Jinlin, claiming that Li Hongshan defrauded the plaintiff of the Reform Measures, the trade secret, and 
provided it to Yuan Jinlin, who then used the Reform Measures in competing with the plaintiff for the 
position of General HR Chief. The lower courts dismissed the plaintiff’s claims, reasoning that the 
evidence was insufficient to show that the plaintiff accomplished the Reform Measures independently.  The 
plaintiff appealed to the Supreme People’s Court, which again dismissed the plaintiff’s request. According 
to the Supreme People’s Court, the Law Against Unfair Competition is meant to regulate market entities 
that take part in market dealings and to regulate market activities that are conducted by such market entities.  
In this case, the plaintiff does not deal with commodities trading or for-profit services, and he has not 
established any relationship of market competition with the three defendants.  Therefore, the claimed act is 
not any type of “market competition” regulated by the Law Against Unfair Competition. 
 
25 Beijing Yehongda Jingmao Youxian Gongsi yu Tianjin Kaifa Qu Taisheng Maoyi Youxian 
Gongsi deng Shangbiao Xuke Shiyong Hetong Jiufen An (	(7ȉəW%3eDªdx
əUW%,ƉɁ#s&(ȃȇ\) [Beijing Yehongda Trading Co. v. Tianjin Dev. Zone 
Taisheng Trading Co.], Civil Application for Retrial No. 1501 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2012).  In March 2007, 
plaintiff Beijing Yehongda Trading Co., Ltd. acquired from a third party the exclusive right to use and 
sublicense rights of the trademark “wolsey and its image.”  In April 2007, the plaintiff later signed a 
“Sublicense Agreement” with defendant Tianjin Development Zone Taisheng Trading Co., Ltd., granting 
the later the exclusive right to use said trademark and others for the period of May 2007 to December 2013 
in exchange for a fee and disclosure of financial records and reports.  On the same day, the two signed a 
“Supplemental Agreement,” in which the parties agreed that the legal representative of the defendant would 
216 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 24 NO. 1 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
sign a new agreement with the plaintiff after he established a new company, Guangzhou Ruixiangchun 
Leather Accessories Co., Ltd., the other named defendant in the case.  When the defendants found that the 
trademark in question failed to complete the registration and was accordingly sanctioned, they refused to 
pay for the fees and make disclosures as agreed in the prior agreements.  The plaintiff filed suit.  After the 
No. 2 Intermediary Court of Beijing ruled for the defendants, the Higher People’s Court reversed and ruled 
the agreements in question valid. The defendants then appealed to the Supreme People’s Court, which 
denied their appeal request. According to the Supreme People’s Court, the agreements in question were 
expressions of mutual consent, and sublicensing a trademark in the process of registration is a legal act.  
Further, because the agreements did not stipulate that all trademarks shall be registered, but instead 
included a “no guarantee of validity” clause, the defendants, as the licensee, have the responsibility of 
checking the status of the trademarks.  Lastly, because the defendants did not prove the essential business 
value of the trademark in question, the failure of registration did not affect the fundamental purpose of the 
agreements.  In sum, the plaintiff’s act was not fraudulent, but proper. 
26 Jichuan Yaoye Jituan Gufen Youxian Gongsi yu Beijing Furuikangzheng Yiyao Jishu Yanjiu Suo 
Jishu Zhuanrang Hetong Jiufen An (Ƴ?Ȣ(ÊW%	|pC_ȢLżz~KLż
ɦȾ&(ȃȇ\) [Jiangsu Jumpcan Pharm. Grp. Co. v. Beijing Furuikangzheng Med. Tech. Research 
Inst.], Civil Application for Retrial No. 718 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2013).  In December 2003, plaintiff Jiangsu 
Jumpcan Pharmaceutical Group Co., Ltd. and defendant Beijing Furuikangzheng Medical Technology 
Research Institute signed a “New Medicine Technology Transfer Contract,” agreeing to transfer the clinic 
documents of ropivacaine hydrochloride, including both the ingredients and injections.  The parties also 
agreed that the defendant was responsible for the authenticity and reliability of all technologies and 
information provided and that the defendant should refund all transfer fees within days if the new medicine 
fails the declaration because of the defendant’s technical problems. In August 2008, China Food and Drug 
Administration issued an opinion denying the registration request of ropivacaine hydrochloride and its 
injections for authenticity issues in the application materials that were initially submitted by the defendant.  
The plaintiff brought suit requesting termination of contract and reimbursement of all paid transfer fees and 
associated losses. After the lower courts granted the plaintiff such requests, the defendant appealed to the 
Supreme People’s Court. The Supreme People’s Court affirmed the lower courts’ judgment, reasoning that 
Article 349 of the Contract Law prescribes that the transferor in a technology transfer contract should 
guarantee its legal ownership as well as the integrity, correctness, and validity of technology.  Also, given 
what the parties had agreed upon in the contract, the defendant had the responsibility of guaranteeing the 
authenticity and reliability of all transferred technologies and information. Further, a medicine registration 
applicant should be held liable for its application materials under the Provisions for Drug Registration.  For 
all of the above reasons, the Court found that the defendant should be liable for contract breach. 
 
27 Dabao Huazhuang Pin Gongsi yu Dabao Rihua Chang deng Qinhai Zhuce Shangbiao Zhuanyong 
Quan he Bu Zhengdang Jingzheng Jiufen An (ãòèÁq³$ãòŭ£ǼcöƮzÅƉ%Ǘž¿
#ƛĢǹ;ȃȇƐ) [Beijing Dabao Cosmetics Co. v. Dabao Daily Chem. Prod. Factory], Civil Retrial No. 
166 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2012).  Beijing Sanlu Factory (“Sanlu Factory”), a third party in this case, registered 
the trademark “Dabao” and founded Beijing Dabao Specialty Adhesives Plant (“Adhesives Plant”).  
Adhesives Plant started to use the “Dabao” trademark for its five-cleaning powder since 1991. Sanlu 
Factory later founded Beijing Dabao Cosmetics Co., Ltd. (“Dabao Cosmetics”), which received 
authorization from Adhesives Plant to use “Dabao” on its products.  In 2004, Adhesives Plant went through 
shareholding reform and changed its name to Dabao Daily Chemical Products Factory (“Dabao Daily”), 
which continued using “Dabao” on its five-cleaning powder products.  One month later, Sanlu Factory 
transferred all of its trademark ownership to “Dabao” and related characters and images to Dabao 
Cosmetics. In 2007, Dabao Daily entered into a business agreement with Shenzhen Biguiyuan Chemicals 
Co., Ltd. (“Biguiyuan”) and jointly promoted their products under the name of “Dabao Rihua.”  In 2008, 
Sanlu Factory sold all its equity in Dabao Cosmetics to Johnson & Johnson (China) Investment Co., Ltd. 
(Johnson & Johnson) without including Dabao Daily in the process.  Subsequently, Dabao Cosmetics 
brought a trademark infringement and unfair competition case against Dabao Daily and Biguiyuan, The 
Supreme People’s Court ruled that Dabao Daily Chemical should stop using the “Dabao” trademark on its 
products but may retain “Dabao” in its business name because of its long use history and the absence of 
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evidence showing that it shall cease using the name at the time of Johnson & Johnson’s acquisition of 
Dabao Cosmetics.   
 
28 Longcheng Gongsi yu Tongba Gongsi Qinhai Shiyong Xinxing Zhuanli Quan  Jiufen An (ʛķq
³$Ǻʟq³cöóǗŨ×%žȃȇƐ) [Lerado Indus. Co. v. Hubei Tongba Children’s Appliances 
Co.], Civil Retrial No. 116 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2013).  As the owner of a utility model patent titled “Front-
wheel Positioning Device,” plaintiff Lerado Industrial Co., Ltd. (“Lerado”) brought a patent infringement 
claim against Tongba Children’s Appliances Co., Ltd. (“Tongba”) in 2008.  Later, the two parties reached a 
civil mediation agreement, which specified that Tongba would compensate Lerado one million RMB if 
another infringement occurred in the future.  When Lerado found that Tongba continued infringing 
Lerado’s patent, Lerado brought another patent infringement claim against Tongba. In the current lawsuit, 
Lerado clarified that the claim basis is the patent infringement rather than the breach of contract.  The 
Intermediate People’s Court and the Higher People’s Court decided that the amount determined in the 
mediation agreement cannot be applied in this patent infringement suit.  The Supreme People’s Court 
overturned, holding that Tongba shall compensate one million RMB to Lerado as specified in the 
agreement. 
 
29! Zhengzhou Runda Gongsi, Chen Rongting, yu Hubei Jieda Gongsi deng Qinhai Shangye Mimi 
Jiufen Guanxia Quan Yiyi An (ɿČƶɬq³0ʗĚȡ$Ƹưɬq³ǼcöÅ(ǱùȃȇǾɪžĝ
ȿƐ) [Zhengzhou Runda Elect. Powered Cleaning Co. v. Hubei Jieda Envtl. Eng’g Co.], Civil Retrial No. 
16 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2013).  Plaintiff Hubei Jieda Environmental Engineering Co., Ltd. brought a claim 
for the  infringement of trade secrets against three named defendants in the Intermediate People’s Court of 
Jingzhou, Hubei.  The Intermediate People’s Court and the Higher People’s Court of Hubei reasoned that 
jurisdiction is permissible either in the courts of provinces where the defendants were domiciled or in the 
courts of provinces where the result of an infringement occurred.  The two courts then decided that their 
jurisdiction was permissible, because Jinzhou city is where the plaintiff was located, and therefore is where 
the result of the alleged infringement occurred.  The Supreme People’s Court overturned, deciding that the 
place of the infringement result in this case was the same as the place where the defendants committed the 
infringement acts, which was not in Jinzhou city.  For that reason, the Supreme People’s Court ruled that 
the Intermediate People’s Court of Jinzhou did not have the jurisdiction over this case. 
 
30 Jiangxi Geli Gongsi yu Jiangxi Meidi Gongsi deng Buzhengdang Jingzheng Jiufen An (ƦȳƎ
q³$ƦȳȒǠq³Ǽ#ƛĢǹ;ȃȇƐ) [Jiangxi Shengshi Xinxing Gree Co. v. Jiangxi Midea 
Refrigeration Equipment Sales Co.], Civil Application for Retrial No. 2270 (Sup. People's Ct. 2013).  
Jiangxi Shengshi Xinxing Gree Co. Ltd. (“Gree”) was responsible for the sales of Gree AC products in the 
Province of Jiangxi.The products were advertised as using 1-Hz Frequency Conversion Technology.  
Meanwhile, Jiangxi Midea Refrigeration Equipment Sales Co., Ltd. (“Midea”) was responsible for the sales 
of Midea AC products in Jiangxi, and those products were advertised as using All DC Frequency 
Conversion Technology.  Midea published ads in several newspapers that read “All DC is better than 1-Hz, 
why,” and “1-Hz is out, stop fooling customers.”  Gree subsequently published ads in the same newspapers 
which read “All DC is out, stop using technology from 10 year ago.”  Gree than filed a lawsuit against 
Midea, claiming that Midea’s newspaper ads constituted illicit competition.  In response, Midea filed a 
counterclaim, charging that Gree’s newspapers ads constituted illicit competition.  The Supreme People’s 
Court held that despite the fact that the two claims were based on different facts, they were closely related 
to and were developed against each other, so the two claims could be tried in one case as case in chief and a 
counterclaim, respectively. 
 
31 Ansitailai Zhiyao Zhushi Huishe yu Lisite Gongsi deng Qinhai Faming Zhuanli Quan Jiufen An (î
ŧƯƁȢƊĞUǭ$į《q³Ǽcöªů%žȃȇƐ) [Astellas Pharma Inc. v. Chengdu List 
Pharmaceutical Co.], Civil Application for Retrial No. 261 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2013).  Astellas Pharma Inc. 
(“Astellas”) was the owner of the patent entitled “Synthetic Method of Tetrahydrobenzene and Imidazole 
Derivatives (‘Synthetic Method’).”  Astellas filed a lawsuit against Chengdu List Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. 
and an individual, Hongbing Zhang. During the first trial, the parties’ dispute focused on whether List had 
outsourced Remosetron raw material, and whether the method List used to convert Remostron raw material 
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into Ramosetron hydrochloride was included in patent claim § 9.  In the second trial, however, Astellas 
calculated the amount of Remosetron raw material that was needed, which was higher than the amount 
outsourced from a third party; Astellas thus argued that List may have Remosetron resources other than 
outsourcing.  In response, List submitted copies of two invoices to the court afterwards, to prove that the 
amount it outsourced was higher than what Astellas had alleged.  Besides the copies of invoices, on appeal, 
List submitted five original invoices and relevant vouchers as well as stock inspection reports.  Astellas 
moved to exclude the evidence, on the basis that the evidence was under the control of List at all times and 
was not new evidence.  The Supreme People’s Court noted that the failure of List to submit the evidence 
was closely related to the change of disputes; furthermore, the evidence was key evidence, and therefore 
should be permitted to trial as “new evidence.”  
 
32 Xinbote Sangdengcai deng yu Yuangu Zhizuo Zhushi Huishe deng Qinhai Zhuzuo Quan Jiufen 
An (ck·]ulÏYF{9žȃȇ\) [Saengduenchai v. Tsuburaya Prod. 
Co.], Civil Application for Retrial No. 259 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2011).  Plaintiffs Chaiyo Productions Co., 
Ltd. and its CEO Sompote Saengduenchai brought a copyright infringement case against defendants 
Tsuburaya Production Co., Ltd., Shanghai Tsuburaya Co., Ltd., Guangzhou Book Center Co., Ltd., and 
Shanghai Audio and Video Publishing House.  Given the parties’ history of litigation over disputes in Japan 
and Thailand, when examining the two key pieces of evidence, the “1976 Contract” and the “Apology 
Letter,” the Intermediary Court of Guangzhou accepted the authentication conclusion certified by an expert 
panel from the General Administration of Police Evidence Examination Department of Thailand.  The court 
ruled that the “1976 Contract” lacked authenticity and that the “Apology Letter” was authentic but 
insufficient to support the Authenticity of the “1976 Contract.”  The Higher People’s Court of Guangzhou 
reversed, deciding that the judgment of the Thai courts was not binding, that the defendants shall cease the 
infringement, and reimburse the plaintiffs for loss.  The defendants then appealed to the Supreme People’s 
Court, which dismissed the appeal request.  According to the Supreme People’s Court, authentication 
conclusions certified by authentication agencies are a type of evidence.  An authentication conclusion of 
high litigation value shall meet the standards of objectivity, relevancy, and legality.  Instead of accepting as 
true, Chinese courts shall examine authentication conclusions certified by foreign authentication agencies 
according to applicable laws of China.  In this case, the plaintiffs disputed the authentication conclusion on 
reasonable grounds, so the Higher People’s Court was allowed to refuse to admit the conclusion into 
evidence. 
 
33 Yibin Changyi Jiangpo Youxian Zeren Gongsi yu Weifang Henglian Jiangzhi Youxian Gongsi 
Qinhai Faming Zhuanli Quan Jiufen An (8øʎ`ƲWɗ%ƽ.JȗƲȈW%9
ªT%žȃȇ\) [Yibin Changyi Jiangpo Co. v. Weifang Henglian Jiangzhi Co.], Civil Application for 
Retrial No. 309 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2013).  Plaintiff Yibin Changyi Jiangpo Co., Ltd. was the patent owner 
of the “Acetanier Denaturation Production Technique.”  Defendant Chengdu Xinruixin Plastics Co., Ltd. 
sold viscose acetanier products produced by co-defendant Weifang Henglian Jiangzhi Co., Ltd.  The 
plaintiff sued the defendants for patent infringement.  The Intermediary Court of Chengdu ruled against the 
defendants, reasoning that when the plaintiff was unable to acquire evidence of the production technique of 
the defendants’ products, the defendants should bear the production burden.  When the defendants failed to 
provide the evidence without proper reasons, the presumption should be that the plaintiff’s claims were true.  
The Higher People’s Court affirmed the ruling.  Weifang Henglian Jiangzhi Co., Ltd. appealed to the 
Supreme People’s Court, which dismissed the appeal request.  According to the Supreme People’s Court, 
where the defendants refused to cooperate with the lower court’s evidence collection procedures, a 
conclusion could reasonably be drawn that the defendants have infringed the plaintiff’s patent. 
 
